Daniel B. Klein

De Wikiberal.

Daniel B. Klein
Économiste
Dates
Tendance
Origine	États-Unis
Articles internes	Liste de tous les articles
Citation
inter lib.org sur Daniel B. Klein

Daniel B. Klein est un économiste américain, professeur d'économie à l'université de Santa Clara.

Bibliographie

• 1985, “Deductive economic methodology in the French Enlightenment: Condillac and Destutt de Tracy”, History of Political Economy, 17:1, pp51-71

• 1987, "Tie-ins and the Market Provision of Collective Goods", Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Spring, pp451-474

• 1988,
  • a. avec John Majewski, "Private Profit, Public Good, and Engineering Failure: The Plank Roads of New York", Working Paper 88/3, Institute for Humane Studies, George Mason University
  • b. avec John Majewski, "Privatization, Regulation, and Public Repossession: The Turnpike Companies of Early America", Photocopy, University of California, Irvine

• 1990, The Voluntary provision of public goods? The Turnpike Companies of early America, Economic Inquiry, 28(4), pp788-812, octobre
  • Repris en 2002, In: David Beito, Peter Gordon et Alexander Tabarrok, dir., The Voluntary City, edited by . Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press

• 1992,
  • a. Go Ahead and Let Him Try: A Plea for Egonomic Laissez-Faire, Vol 35, Journal of Philosophy, pp3-20
  • b. avec Gordon J. Fielding, Private Toll Roads: Learning from the Nineteenth Century, Transportation Quarterly, juillet, Vol 46, n°3, pp321-341
  • c. avec John Majewski, "Economy, Community and Law: The Turnpike Movement in New York, 1797-1845", Law & Society Review, Vol 26, n°3, pp469-512
  • d. "Promise Keeping in the Great Society: A Model of Credit Information Sharing", Economics and Politics, 4, pp117–136
  • e. avec Jason Richner, In Defense of the Credit Bureau, Cato Journal, 12, pp393–412

• 1993,
  • a. avec Gordon J. Fielding, How to Franchise Highways, Journal of Transportation Economics and Policy, Vol. XXVII No. 2, mai, pp113-130
  • b. avec Christopher Baer et John Majewski, Economy, Community and the Law: The Turnpike Movement in New York, 1797–1845, Journal of Economic History, mars, pp106-122
  • c. avec Christopher Baer et John Majewski, From Trunk to Branch: Toll Roads in New York, 1800–1860, In: Essays in Economic and Business History Conference Proceedings for the Economic and Business Historical Society, pp191-209
  • d. avec Gordon J. Fielding, High Occupancy/Toll Lanes: Phasing in Congestion Pricing a Lane at a Time, Policy Study, n°170, novembre
  • e. avec Christopher Baer et John Majewski, "Responding to Relative Decline: The Plank Road Boom of Antebellum New York", Journal of Economic History, Vol 53, n°1, pp106-122

• 1994,
  • a. If Government Is So Villainous, How Come Government Officials Don’t Seem Like Villains?, Economics and Philosophy 10: 91–106
    • Version révisée en 1998, In: Libertarian Essays, Irvington, NY: Foundation for Economic Éducation
  • b. The Moral Consequences of Paternalism, The Freeman, Mai, Vol 44, n°5
  • c. Private Highways in America, 1792-1916, The Freeman, Février, Vol 44, n°2
    • Repris en 1996, Private Highways in America, 1792-1916, In: Wilson J. Mixon Jr, dir, Private means, Public Ends: Voluntarism vs Coercicion, Foundation For Economic Education, Irvington on Hudson: NY, pp128-133
  • d. avec John Majewski, "Plank Road Fever in Antebellum America: New York State Origins", New York History, pp39-65

• 1995, commentaire du livre de Charles T. Sprading, dir., "Liberty and the Great Libertarians edited and compiled", The Freeman, December, Vol 45, n°12

• 1996, avec Chi Yin, "Use, Esteem, and Profit in Voluntary Provision: Toll Roads in California, 1850-1902", Economic Inquiry, pp678-692

• 1997,
  • a. Convention, Social Order, and the Two Coordinations, Constitutional Political Economy, 8:319-335
  • b. Liberty, Dignity, and Responsibility: The Moral Triad of a Good Society, The Independent Review, Vol 1, n°3, Winter, pp325-352
    • Repris en 1998, In: 3 Libertarian Essays. FEE Occasional Paper, n°1, Irvington, NY: Foundation for Economic Éducation: pp25-59
  • c. Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
  • d. "Knowledge, Reputation, and Trust, by Voluntary Means", In: Daniel B. Klein, dir., Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press
  • e. avec Jeremy Shearmur, Good Conduct in the Great Society: Adam Smith and the Role of Reputation, In: Daniel B. Klein,, dir., Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp29-45
  • f. Trust for Hire: Voluntary Remedies for Quality and Safety, In: Daniel B. Klein, dir., Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, pp97-133
  • g. avec Adrian T. Moore et Binyam Reja, Curb Rights: Eliciting Competition and Entrepreneurship in Urban Transit, The Independent Review, Vol 2, n°1, Summer
  • h. Planning, Urban Transit, and the Two Coordinations, Department of Economics, Santa Clara University, Calif. Manuscript
  • i. avec Adrian T. Moore et Binyam Reja, Curb Rights: A Foundation for Free Enterprise in Urban Transit. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution
  • j. commentaire du livre d'Andrew Gamble, "Hayek : The Iron Cage of Liberty", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 8, pp255-264

• 1998,
  • a. Planning and the Two Coordinations, avec Illustrations in Urban Transit, Planning and Markets, Volume 1, Number 1
  • b. Quality-and-Safety Assurance: How Voluntary Social Processes Remedy Their Own Shortcomings, The Independent Review, Spring, Vol 2, n°4, pp549-50

• 1999,
  • a. What Do Economists Contribute ?, New York: New York University Press
  • b. Discovery and the Deepself, The Review of Austrian Economics, 11
  • c. "The Ways of John Gray: A Libertarian Commentary", The Independent Review, Vol 4, n°1, Summer, pp63–89
  • d. "Assurance and Trust in a Great Society", FEE Occasional Paper n°2, Irvington, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education
  • e. avec Jeremy Shearmur, "Good Conduct in a Great Society: Adam Smith and the Role of Reputation", In: Daniel B. Klein, dir., "Assurance and Trust in a Great Society", FEE Occasional Paper n°2, Irvington, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education

• 2000, What Do Academic Economists Contribute?, Policy, Winter, Vol 16, n°2

• 2001,
  • a. Plea to Economists Who Favor Liberty: Assist the Everyman, Eastern Economic Journal, vol. 27, n°2, pp185-202
  • b. "Credit-Information Reporting. Why Free Speech Is Vital to Social Accountability and Consumer Opportunity", Independent review, Vol 3, n°1, winter, p325

• 2002,
  • a. avec Fred E. Foldvary, The Half-Life of Policy Rationales: How New Technology Affects Old Policy Issues, Knowledge, Technology, & Policy, Vol 15, n°3, Fall, pp82-92
  • b. Asymmetric Interpretations, Journal des économistes et des études humaines, Vol 12, n°1, mars
  • c. The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies of Early America, In: David Beito, Peter Gordon et Alexander Tabarrok, dir., The Voluntary City: Choice, Community, and Civil Society, Ch 4, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor

• 2003,
  • a. avec H. Demmert, Experiment on Entrepreneurial Discovery: An Attempt to Demonstrate the Conjecture of Hayek and Kirzner, Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, Vol 50, n°3, pp295–310
  • b. Fencing the Airshed: Using Remote Sensing to Police Auto Emissions, In: Fred E. Foldvary et Daniel B. Klein, Dir., The Half-Life of Policy Rationales: How New Technology Affects Old Policy Issues, New York: New York University Press, pp86-106
  • c. avec Fred E. Foldvary, The Half-Life of Policy Rationales: How New Technology Affects Old Policy Issues, New York: New York University Press
• 2004,
  • a. avec Therese DiCola, Institutional Ties of Journal of Development Economics Authors and Editors, Econ Journal Watch 1(2): 319-330
  • b. Mere Libertarianism: Blending Hayek and Rothbard, Reason Papers 27: 7-42
  • c. The People’s Romance: Why People Love Government (As Much As They Do), The Independent Review
  • d. avec Alexander Tabarrok, Quotations: Economists’ Judgments about the FDA

• 2005,
  • a. Information-Knowledge Symposium: Introduction, Econ Journal Watch, Volume 2, Number 1, avril, Symposium on Information and Knowledge in Economics, pp47-55
  • b. The Ph.D. Circle in Academic Economics. Econ Journal Watch 2(1), avril: 133-48
  • c. avec Charlotta Stern, Professors and Their Politics: The Policy Views of Social Scientists. Critical Review 17(3-4): 257-303
  • d. avec Charlotta Stern, Political Diversity in Six Disciplines, Academic Questions 18(1), Winter: 40-52
  • e. avec Christopher Cardiff, Faculty Partisan Affiliations in All Disciplines: A Voter-Registration Study, Critical Review, Vol 17, n°3-4, pp237-255
  • f. avec Andrew Western, Voter Registration of Berkeley and Stanford Faculty, Academic Questions 18(1): 53–65
  • g. The People’s Romance: Why People Love Government (as Much as They Do), The Independent Review, Vol 10, n°1, Summer, pp5–37

• 2006,
  • a. avec Charlotta Stern, Sociology and Classical Liberalism, The Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy, 11(1), Summer, pp37-52
  • b. Sense and Sensibilities: Myrdal’s Plea for Self-Disclosure and Some Disclosures about AEA Members, Econ Journal Watch 3(1): 180–205
  • c. avec Charlotta Stern, Economists’ Policy Views and Voting, Public Choice, 126 (mars, pp331-342
  • d. Free Parking versus Free Markets, The Independent Review, Vol 11, n°2, Fall, pp289-297

• 2007,
  • a. avec Charlotta Stern, Is There a Free-Market Economist in the House? The Policy Views of American Economics Association Members, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 66(2), avril: 309-334
  • b. The Smith-Hayek Economist: From Character to Identity, The Library of Economics and Liberty, Liberty Fund, mars 5
  • c. avec Dan J. D’Amico, The Internet and the Structure of Discourse: The Websites of Economists at Harvard and George Mason, Econ Journal Watch, Vol 4, n°2, Mai, pp272-283.

• 2008,
  • a. Toward a Public and Professional Identity for Our Economics, Econ Journal Watch, 5(3), pp358–372
  • b. avec John Majewski, "Turnpikes and Toll Roads in Nineteenth-Century America", In: Robert Whaples, dir., EH.Net Encyclopedia, 10 février 2008

• 2009,
  • a. avec Jason Briggerman, "Israel Kirzner on Coordination and Discovery", The Journal of Private Enterprise, 25 (1), pp1-53
  • b. avec Aaron Orsborn, “Concatenate coordination and mutual coordination”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 72, pp176–187
  • c. avec Charlotta Stern, Groupthink in Academia: Majoritarian Departmental Politics and the Professional Pyramid, The Independent Review, Vol 13, n°4, Spring, pp585–600
  • d. avec Jason Briggeman, "Conservative Magazines and the Presumption of Liberty: A Content Analysis on Sex, Gambling, and Drugs", The Independent Review, Vol 14, n°2, Fall, pp289–299

• 2010, "Knowledge Flat-talk: A Conceit of Supposed Experts and a Seduction to All", The Independent Review, 15(1), pp109-121

• 2011, avec Michael J. Clark, The Music of Social Intercourse: Synchrony in Adam Smith, The Independent Rewiew, winter

Littérature secondaire

• 2010, Robert P. Murphy, Coordination: A Critique of Daniel Klein, The Journal of Private Enterprise, 25(2), pp117-127
  

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