Oliver Hart

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Oliver D. Hart est reconnu parmi les économistes pour sa théorie des contrats incomplets. En théorie de l'organisation et de la firme, il a permis de faire avancer la compréhension du phénomène de la dé-intégration verticale.

Bibliographie

• 1980, avec Sanford J. Grossman, Takeover Bids, The Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation, Bell Journal of Economics, 11:42–64

• 1983,
  • a. avec Sanford J. Grossman, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, Econometrica, Vol. 51, No. 1 (January), pp7-46
  • b. « Optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information : an introductio», Review of Economic Studies, 50, pp3-35

• 1985, avec Roger Guesnerie, Welfare losses due to imperfect competition : Asymptotic results for Cournot-Nash equilibria with free entry, International Economic Review, Philadelphia, vol. 26, oct., n° 3, pp525-545

• 1986, avec Sanford J. Grossman, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, 94-4, pp691-719

• 1987, avec Bengt Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts, In: T. Bewley, Dir., Advances in Economic Theory-Fifth World Congress, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp71-155

• 1988,
  • a. avec Sanford J Grossman, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, pp691-719
  • b. Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Law, Economics ans Organization, Vol 4, pp119-140
    • Repris en 1991, In: Oliver Williamson et Sidney G. Winter, dir., The Nature of the Firm, Oxford University Press, pp138-159
  • c. avec John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, Econometrica, 56, pp755-785

• 1989, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, Columbia Law Review 89(7): 1757-1774
  • Repris en 1986, In: Louis Putterman et Randall S. Kroszner, dir., The Economic Nature of the Firm. A Reader, ch 26
  • Repris en 1996, In: Peter J. Buckley et Jonathan Michie, dir., Firms, Organizations and Contracts, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp199-218

• 1990,
  • a. Is ‘Bounded Rationality’ an important Element of a Theory of Institutions?, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol 146, pp696-702
  • b. avec Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, pp205–76
  • c. avec John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), pp119–158

• 1995,
  • a. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford
  • b. Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications, The Economic Journal, Vol 105(430): 678–89

• 1997, avec A. Shleifer et R. W. Vishny, The proper scope of government: theory and an application to prisons, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112(4), pp1126-1161

• 2003, Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships, Economic Journal, 113, March, pp69-76
  • Repris en 2005, In: D. Grimsey et M. K. Lewis, dir., The Economics of Public Private Partnerships, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

• 2008, Economica Coase Lecture Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm, Economica, Vol. 75, n°299, August, pp404-411
  

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