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{{Infobox individu
{{Infobox individu
| identité        =Benjamin Klein
| identité        = Benjamin Klein
| type            = [[:catégorie:économistes|économiste]]
| type            = [[:Catégorie:Économistes|économiste]]
| dates          =  
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| nationalité    = {{états-Unis}}
| Catallaxia      =  
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'''Benjamin Klein''' est un économiste américain qui s'est intéressé à une approche concurrentielle du système monétaire.
'''Benjamin Klein''' est un économiste américain qui s'est intéressé à une approche concurrentielle du système monétaire et à la théorie de l'[[intégration verticale]].


==Bibliographie==
==Bibliographie==
* [[1973]], avec [[Armen Alchian]], On aCorrect Measure of Inflation, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 5, n°1, pp173—191


* [[1974]], "The Competitive Supply of Money." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 6 (Nov. 1974): 423-453
* [[1974]], "The Competitive Supply of Money." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 6 (Nov. 1974): 423-453
Ligne 19 : Ligne 22 :
* [[1976]], "Competing Monies: A Comment." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 8 (Nov. 1976): 513-519
* [[1976]], "Competing Monies: A Comment." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 8 (Nov. 1976): 513-519
* [[1976]], "The Social Costs of the Recent Inflation: The Mirage of Steady 'Anticipated' Inflation." In [[Karl Brunner]] et [[Allan Meltzer]],  eds. Institutional Arrangements and the Inflation Problem. New York: North Holland Publishing, pp185-212
* [[1976]], "The Social Costs of the Recent Inflation: The Mirage of Steady 'Anticipated' Inflation." In [[Karl Brunner]] et [[Allan Meltzer]],  eds. Institutional Arrangements and the Inflation Problem. New York: North Holland Publishing, pp185-212
* [[1978]],  
* [[1978]],  
** a. Competing Monies, European Monetary Union, and the Dollar." In M. Fratianni and T. Peeters, eds., One Money for Europe. London: Macmillan
** a. Competing Monies, European Monetary Union, and the Dollar." In M. Fratianni and T. Peeters, eds., One Money for Europe. London: Macmillan
** b. Money, Wealth, and Seignorage, In: Kenneth Boulding and Thomas Frederick Wilson, eds., Redistribution Through the Financial System. New York: Praeger
** b. "Money, Wealth, and Seignorage", In: [[Kenneth E. Boulding]] et Thomas Frederick Wilson, dir., Redistribution Through the Financial System. New York: Praeger
** c. avec Robert G. Crawford et [[Armen Alchian]], Vertical integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process, Journal of Law and Economics, 21, pp297-326
** c. avec Robert G. Crawford et [[Armen Alchian]], Vertical integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process, Journal of Law and Economics, 21, pp297-326


* [[1978]], avec Robert Crawford et [[Benjamin Klein]], "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process" (Intégration verticale, rentes appropriables et le processus contractiuel en concurrence), Journal of Law and Economics
** Repris en [[1986]], In: [[Louis Putterman]], Randall S. Kroszner, dir., "The Economic Nature of the Firm. A Reader", Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, ch 8, pp96-115


* [[1980]],  
* [[1980]],  
** a. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28198005%2970%3A2%3C356%3ATCDO%22C%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements], The American Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May), pp356-362
** a. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28198005%2970%3A2%3C356%3ATCDO%22C%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements], The American Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (mai), pp356-362
** b. The borderlines of law and economic theory: Transaction cost determinants of 'unfair' contractual arrangements, Am. Econ. Rev., 70, 356
** b. The borderlines of law and economic theory: Transaction cost determinants of 'unfair' contractual arrangements, Am. Econ. Rev., Vol 70, n°2, pp356-362
 
* [[1981]], avec Keith B. Leffler, [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28198108%2989%3A4%3C615%3ATROMFI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance], The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 4. (Aug.), pp615-641
* [[1981]], avec Keith B. Leffler, [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28198108%2989%3A4%3C615%3ATROMFI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance], The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 4. (Aug.), pp615-641
* [[1983]], Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics. 26: 367–374
 
* [[1985]], avec Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 28, pp345-361
* [[1983]],  
* [[1988]], Vertical Integration as Organized Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4 (Spring, pp199–233
** a. Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics. 26: 367–374
* [[1993]], [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0736-9921%281993%293%3C43%3AMPIAEA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak], Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol. 3, pp43-92
** b. avec Roy W. Kenney, The Economics of Block Booking, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 26, n°3, october, pp497-540
* [[1995]], The Economics of Franchise Contracts, Journal of Corporate Finance: Contracting, Governance and Organization, Vol 2, pp9-38
 
* [[1985]],  
** a. avec Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 28, n°2, pp345-361
** b. Self-Enforcing Contracts, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, pp594-600
 
* [[1987]], [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID937510_code232942.pdf?abstractid=937510&mirid=1 The Economic Lessons of Fisher Body-General Motors], International Journal of the Economics of Business, Vol 14, n°1, February, pp1-36
 
 
* [[1988]],  
** a. Vertical Integration as Organized Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4, Spring, pp199–233
** b. avec Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as contract enforcement mechanism, Journal of Law and Economics, 31(2), pp265-297
 
 
* [[1993]],  
** a. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0736-9921%281993%293%3C43%3AMPIAEA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak], Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol. 3, pp43-92
** b. [http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/BrandNames.html "Brand Names"], In: [[David R. Henderson]], dir., The Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics: 141 Top Economists Explain the Theories, Mechanics, and Institutions of Money, Trade, and Markets, New York: Warner Books, Inc.
*** Nouvelle édition en [[2002]], [http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/BrandNames.html "Brand Names"]
 
* [[1995]], The Economics of Franchise Contracts, Journal of Corporate Finance: Contracting, Governance and Organization, Vol 2, n°1/2, pp9-38
 
* [[1996]],  
* [[1996]],  
** a. [https://www.u-cursos.cl/ingenieria/2007/2/IN78A/1/material_docente/objeto/141062 Market Power in Aftermarkets, Managerial and Decision Economics], Vol. 17, No. 2, Special Issue: The Role of Economists in Modern Antitrust. (Mar. - Apr.), pp143-164
** a. [https://www.u-cursos.cl/ingenieria/2007/2/IN78A/1/material_docente/objeto/141062 Market Power in Aftermarkets, Managerial and Decision Economics], Vol. 17, No. 2, Special Issue: The Role of Economists in Modern Antitrust. (Mar. - Apr.), pp143-164
** b. Why "hold-ups" occur: The "self-enforcing range" of contractual relationships, Economic Inquiry, October
** b. Why "hold-ups" occur: The "self-enforcing range" of contractual relationships, Economic Inquiry, Vol 34, octobre, pp444-463
* [[2000]], Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, Journal of Law and Economics. 43 (1): 105–141
** c. avec Elizabeth Granitz, Monopolization by raising rivals’ costs: the Standard Oil Case, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XXXIX, avril, pp1-47
* [[2004]], Fisher Body-General Motors Once Again: How Do We Know When a Holdup Occurs?, WP., UCLA. 41 pages.
 
* [[1999]], Distribution Restrictions Operate By Creating Dealer Profits: Explaining the Use of Maximum Resale Price Maintenance in State Oil v. Khan, Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol 7, pp1-58
 
* [[2000]],  
** a. Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, Journal of Law and Economics. 43 (1): 105–141
** b. avec Roy W. Kenney, How Block Booking Facilitated Self-Enforcing Film Contracts, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 43, n°2, October, pp427¬435
** c. The Role of Incomplete Contracts In Self-Enforcing Relationships, Revue d'Economie Industrielle, n° 92, 2e et 3e trimestres, n° spécial sur "The Economics of Contract Theories in Prospect and Retrospect", pp67-80
 
* [[2004]], "Fisher Body-General Motors Once Again: How Do We Know When a Holdup Occurs?", WP., UCLA. 41 pages.
 
* [[2010]], "Asset specifi city and holdups", In: [[Peter G. Klein]], Michael E. Sykuta, dir., "The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics", Aldershot, U.K.: Edward Elgar, pp120-126
 
 
 




{{Portail économie}}
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{{portail économie}}
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[[Catégorie:Économistes]]


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Version du 9 novembre 2021 à 14:08

Benjamin Klein
économiste

Dates
Tendance
Origine États-Unis États-Unis
Articles internes Autres articles sur Benjamin Klein

Citation
inter lib.org sur Benjamin Klein

Benjamin Klein est un économiste américain qui s'est intéressé à une approche concurrentielle du système monétaire et à la théorie de l'intégration verticale.

Bibliographie

  • 1973, avec Armen Alchian, On aCorrect Measure of Inflation, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 5, n°1, pp173—191
  • 1974, "The Competitive Supply of Money." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 6 (Nov. 1974): 423-453
  • 1975,
    • a. Our New Monetary Standard: The Measurement and Effects of Price Uncertainty, 1880-1973, Economic Inquiry, Vol 13, Dec., pp461-484
    • b. Commentaire du livre d'Israel Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 83, n°6, Dec., pp1305-1309
  • 1976, "Competing Monies: A Comment." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 8 (Nov. 1976): 513-519
  • 1976, "The Social Costs of the Recent Inflation: The Mirage of Steady 'Anticipated' Inflation." In Karl Brunner et Allan Meltzer, eds. Institutional Arrangements and the Inflation Problem. New York: North Holland Publishing, pp185-212
  • 1978,
    • a. Competing Monies, European Monetary Union, and the Dollar." In M. Fratianni and T. Peeters, eds., One Money for Europe. London: Macmillan
    • b. "Money, Wealth, and Seignorage", In: Kenneth E. Boulding et Thomas Frederick Wilson, dir., Redistribution Through the Financial System. New York: Praeger
    • c. avec Robert G. Crawford et Armen Alchian, Vertical integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process, Journal of Law and Economics, 21, pp297-326
  • 1978, avec Robert Crawford et Benjamin Klein, "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process" (Intégration verticale, rentes appropriables et le processus contractiuel en concurrence), Journal of Law and Economics
    • Repris en 1986, In: Louis Putterman, Randall S. Kroszner, dir., "The Economic Nature of the Firm. A Reader", Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, ch 8, pp96-115
  • 1980,
    • a. Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, The American Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (mai), pp356-362
    • b. The borderlines of law and economic theory: Transaction cost determinants of 'unfair' contractual arrangements, Am. Econ. Rev., Vol 70, n°2, pp356-362
  • 1983,
    • a. Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics. 26: 367–374
    • b. avec Roy W. Kenney, The Economics of Block Booking, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 26, n°3, october, pp497-540
  • 1985,
    • a. avec Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 28, n°2, pp345-361
    • b. Self-Enforcing Contracts, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, pp594-600


  • 1988,
    • a. Vertical Integration as Organized Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4, Spring, pp199–233
    • b. avec Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as contract enforcement mechanism, Journal of Law and Economics, 31(2), pp265-297


  • 1995, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, Journal of Corporate Finance: Contracting, Governance and Organization, Vol 2, n°1/2, pp9-38
  • 1996,
    • a. Market Power in Aftermarkets, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2, Special Issue: The Role of Economists in Modern Antitrust. (Mar. - Apr.), pp143-164
    • b. Why "hold-ups" occur: The "self-enforcing range" of contractual relationships, Economic Inquiry, Vol 34, octobre, pp444-463
    • c. avec Elizabeth Granitz, Monopolization by raising rivals’ costs: the Standard Oil Case, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XXXIX, avril, pp1-47
  • 1999, Distribution Restrictions Operate By Creating Dealer Profits: Explaining the Use of Maximum Resale Price Maintenance in State Oil v. Khan, Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol 7, pp1-58
  • 2000,
    • a. Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, Journal of Law and Economics. 43 (1): 105–141
    • b. avec Roy W. Kenney, How Block Booking Facilitated Self-Enforcing Film Contracts, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 43, n°2, October, pp427¬435
    • c. The Role of Incomplete Contracts In Self-Enforcing Relationships, Revue d'Economie Industrielle, n° 92, 2e et 3e trimestres, n° spécial sur "The Economics of Contract Theories in Prospect and Retrospect", pp67-80
  • 2004, "Fisher Body-General Motors Once Again: How Do We Know When a Holdup Occurs?", WP., UCLA. 41 pages.
  • 2010, "Asset specifi city and holdups", In: Peter G. Klein, Michael E. Sykuta, dir., "The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics", Aldershot, U.K.: Edward Elgar, pp120-126




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