Gordon Tullock

De Wikiberal.

Gordon Tullock
Économiste et sociologue
Dates
Tendance	école de Chicago et école du Public Choice
Origine	États-Unis
Articles internes	Liste de tous les articles
Citation
inter lib.org sur Gordon Tullock
Catallaxia

Gordon Tullock est professeur de droit et d'économie à la George Mason University d'Arlington, en Virginie. Il a fait ses études et enseigné à l'université de Chicago. Il est membre associé à l'Economic Association.

Il est le fondateur, avec James Buchanan, de la théorie des choix publics.

En 1962, il publie avec James M. Buchanan The Calculus of Consent: Logical foundations for constitutional democracy (L'analyse du consentement : Fondations logiques de la démocratie constitutionnelle), l'ouvrage fondateur de la Théorie du choix public. Dans un article[1]publié en 1967, il met en évidence le phénomène de recherche de rente.

En 1981, il met en avant, avec Buchanan et Stiegler, une théorie selon laquelle les dépenses publiques sont liées aux modes de fonctionnements des démocraties occidentales. Il y aurait un processus guidant au choix des dépenses publiques. Les individus, calculateurs, ont des objectifs et recherchent l'optimisation. On arrive au rôle des lobbys. On suppose que l'État est une institution qui produit des biens et des services pour certains agents. Peut-être un petit nombre, un grand nombre, etc. Ensuite, on va supposer que ces agents sont enclins à demander des biens qui concernent plutôt une minorité dans laquelle ils se situent. Ainsi, ils sont plus enclins à les faire financer par la collectivité. Celle-ci, prise dans son ensemble, a intérêt de financer des biens dont le financement est mutualisé.

Bibliographie

• 1954, avec Colin Campbell, Hyper-Inflation in China, 1937-40. Journal of Political Economy 62 (juin), pp237-45
• 1957,
  • a. Paper Money—A Cycle in Cathay, Economic History Review 9 (Aug.): 393-407
  • b. avec C. Campbell, Some Little Understood Aspects of Korea's Monetary and Fiscal System, American Economic Review 47 (juin), pp336-40
    • Traduit en coréen, Seoul National University's Economic Journal
  • c. Japanese Modernization and the West, Prod 1 (novembre), pp28-29.
• 1958, "Reply", American Economic Review 48 (septembre), pp661-62
• 1959,
  • a. Publication Decisions and Tests of Significance: Comment, Journal of the American Statistical Association 54 (septembre), p593
  • b. Korea, In: Collier's Encyclopedia Yearbook for the Year 1959, pp371-73
  • c. Problems of Majority Voting, Journal of Political Economy, 67 (décembre), pp57l-79
    • Repris en 1969, In: Kenneth J. Arrow et Tibor Scitovsky, Dir., Readings in Welfare Economics, Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.), pp169-78
    • Traduit en italien en 1973, Problemi del voto a maggioranza, In: Francesco Forte et Gianfranco Mossetto, Dir., Economia del Benessere e Democrazia (Milano:Franco Angeli Editore), pp459-7l
    • Repris In: Thomas Schwartz, Dir., Freedom and Authority: An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Encino, CA: Dickenson Publishing Co.)
  • d. An Introduction to Logical Models, Prod 3, novembre, pp9 - 11
  • e. The Sources of Union Gains, Research monograph, Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy, University of Virginia
  • f. Some problems of majority voting
    • Repris en 1969, In: Kenneth J. Arrow et T. Scitovsky, dir., Readings in welfare economics, London: George Allen and Unwin, pp169-178
• 1960, Aphorisms for the Ambitious, American Behavioral Scientist, 4 (décembre), pp36-38
• 1961,
  • a. The Historic Figure: Why Study Ignorance, American Behavioral Scientist, 5 (novembre), pp25-26
  • b. Korea, In: Collier's Encyclopedia Yearbook for the Year 1960, pp351-54
  • c. Reply to a Traditionalist, Journal of Political Economy, 69, avril, pp200-03
  • d. An Economic Analysis of Political Choice, II Politico, 16, pp234-240
  • e. Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules: Comment, Quarterly Journal of Economics 75 (August), pp493-97
  • f. Our `Other-Directed' Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy Bulletin 1 (novembre), pp 1 - 2
  • g. A Practical Guide for the Ambitious Politician, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press
• 1962,
  • a. avec James M. Buchanan, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
    • Edition Paperback en 1965
    • Traduction espagnole en 1980
    • Traduction japonaise en 1980
  • b. Entrepreneurial Politics. Research monograph #5 (Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy, University of Virginia, février)
• 1965, The Politics of Bureaucracy. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press
• 1966, The Organization of Inquiry. Durham, NC: Duke University Press
• 1967,
  • a. The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, Western Economic Journal, 5 (juin 1967): 224—32
  • b. Toward a Mathematics of Politics, Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press
  • c. The Economics of Slavery, Left and Right, Vol. 3, n°2, Spring-Summer, pp5-16
• 1968, “A Note on Censorship,” The American Political Science Review, 62 (4): 1265-1267
• 1969, The New Theory of Corporations, In: Erich Streissler, Gottfried Haberler, Friedrich Lutz et Fritz Machlup, eds, Roads to Freedom: Essays in honour of Friedrich A. von Hayek, New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 287-307
• 1970, Public Means, Private Wants. New York: Basic Books

• 1971,
  • a. Logic of the Law. New York: Basic Books
  • b. Public Decisions as Public Goods, Journal of Political Economy 79 (4): 913-18
  • c. The Paradox of Revolution, Public Choice II (Fall 1971): 89-100
  • d. The Coal Tit as a Careful Shopper, The American Naturalist 105 (janvier/février): 77–80
  • e. The Cost of Transfers, Kyklos 24, pp629-643
  • f. The Charity of the Uncharitable, Economic Inquiry, 9, décembre, pp379-392
  • g. An Application of Economics in Biology, In: Friedrich Hayek, dir., Towards Liberty: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises, 2 vols, Menlo Park, CA : Institute for Human Studies

• 1972,
  • a. Dir, Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy (Blacksburg, Va.: Center for Study of Public Choice)
  • b. Can You Fool All of the People All of the Time?: A Comment, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 4 (mai): 426-430
  • c. The Edge of the Jungle, In: Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, Gordon Tullock, Dir., Blacksburg, Va.: Center for the Study of Public Choice, pp65–75

• 1973, The Charity of the Uncharitable, In: Armen Alchian, Dir., The Economics of Charity: Essays on the Comparative Economics and Ethics of Giving, with Application to Blood (London: Institute of Economic Affairs

• 1974,
  • a. The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution. Blacksburg, VA: University Publications
  • b. Corruption and Anarchy, In: Gordon Tullock, dir., Further explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, Blacksburg: University Publications, pp65-70
  • c. dir., Further explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, Blacksburg: University Publications

• 1975,
  • a. Competing Monies, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 7 (Nov.): 491-497
  • b. The Transitional Gains Trap, Bell Journal of Economics 6 (Autumn), pp671-678

• 1976,
  • a. Competing Monies: A Reply, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 8, (Nov.), pp521-525
  • b. The Vote Motive, Lansing, England: Institute for Economic Affairs

• 1977, The Social Costs of reducing Social Costs, In "Managing the Commons", ed. Garrett Hardin and John Baden (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman

• 1978, avec Richard McKenzie, Modern Political Economy: An Introduction to Economics, New York: McGraw-Hill

• 1979, "Public Choice in Practice." In Collective Decision Making, edited by Clifford S. Russel. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press
• 1980, Efficient Rent Seeking, In: James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison et Gordon Tullock, Dir. Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (College Station: Texas A&M University Press): 97-112

• 1981, The Rhetoric and Reality of Redistribution, Southern Economic Journal, 47: 895–907

• 1982, Why So Much Stability, Public Choice 37, n°2, pp189-202

• 1984, How to Do Well While Doing Good!, In: David C. Colander, dir., Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, pp229-240
  • Repris en 1999, In: Daniel B. Klein, dir., What Do Economists Contribute? New York: New York University Press, pp87-103

• 1985, “Adam Smith and the Prisoners’ Dilemma.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 (Suppl.): 1073–81
  • Repris en 1997, In: Daniel B. Klein, Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp21–28
• 1987,
  • a. Why the Austrians Are Wrong About Depressions, Review of Austrian Economics 2: 73-78
  • b. The Calculus: Postscript after 25 Years, Cato Journal, 7, pp313-329

• 1988, avec Charles K. Rowley et Robert D. Tollison, The Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers

• 1989,
  • a. Reply to Comment by Joseph T. Salerno, Review of Austrian Economics 3: 147-49
  • b. avec Kevin B. Grier, An Empirical Analysis of Cross-National Economic Growth, 1951-80, Journal of Monetary Economics 24, 2, septembre: 259-76
  • c. The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers

• 1993, Thoughts on Private Roads. Ms. University of Arizona

• 1994,
  • a. La scelta federale, Milano, Franco Angeli
  • b. Court errors, European Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 1, Number 1 / mars, pp9-21
  • c. The New Federalist, Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser Institute

• 1995,
  • a. Thinking about thought, European Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 2, n°2, juin, pp119-125
  • b. Government Growth, Taiwan Journal of Political Economy, 1:21–36

• 1996, Comment on “Roads, Bridges, Sunlight and Private Property, by Walter Block and Matthew Block, Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, (7)4, pp589–592

• 1997, Civilzed Ants, In: Libertarians and Liberalism. Essays in Honour of Gerard Radnitzky, Hardy Bouillon, dir., Suffolk, Gran Bretaña: Ipswich Book Company, pp319-329

• 1999,
  • a. Mises and the dialog of science, Cato journal, 19(2), pp215-228
  • b. Non-Prisoner’s Dilemma, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 39: 455-458

• 2005, Public Goods, Redistribution and Rent Seeking, Edward Elgar

• 2006, avec Jeff R. Clark et L. S. Levy, The Poverty of Politics: How Income Distribution Hurts the Poor, Atlantic Economic Journal, 34, pp47-62

Littérature secondaire

• 1967, Frederick C. Freiling, Tullock on Science and Society, Left and Right, Vol. 3, n°2, Spring-Summer, pp17-21

• 1969, P. Simpson, On Defining Areas of Voter Choice: Professor Tullock on Stable Voting, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 83, pp478-490

• 1987, Richard E. Wagner, Gordon Tullock as Rhetorical Economist, In Democracy and Public Choice: Essays in Honor of Gordon Tullock. Ed. Charles K. Rowley. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
• 2004, Gary A. Wagner et Russell S. Sobel, Expressive Voting and Government Redistribution: Testing Tullock’s ‘Charity of the Uncharitable’, Public Choice 119, No. ½ (avril), pp143-159

Liens externes

• (fr)Catallaxia
• (en)Biographie
  

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