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Richard A. Posner

De Wikiberal
Richard A. Posner
juriste

Dates né en 1939
Posner2.jpg
Tendance Libéral classique, analyse économique du droit et école de Chicago
Origine États-Unis États-Unis
Articles internes Liste de tous les articles

Citation
inter lib.org sur Richard Posner


Le juge Richard Allen Posner (né en 1939) est actuellement juge à la Cour d'Appel fédérale américaine. C'est l'un des fondateurs de l'analyse économique du droit, au sein de l'école de Chicago à partir des travaux de Ronald Coase et de Guido Calabresi. Plus précisément, Richard Posner a innové par rapport à l'économie du droit de Coase pour proposer d'utiliser l'analyse économique pour étudier les phénomènes juridiques (alors que Coase voulait étudier des problèmes économiques influencés par le droit).

Durant sa carrière, il s'est beaucoup penché sur les motivations économiques des juges, en affirmant (en particulier au début) que les systèmes de common law anglo-saxon sont efficaces parce que les juges ont des motivations économiques.

Diplômé de Yale et de Harvard, Posner tient un blog commun avec Gary Becker.

En 1987, en compagnie de William M. Landes, ils explorent l'analyse économique du Droit des marques. Ils montrent pourquoi, si l'appropriation est interdite par une règle de propriété, les avantages de la vulgarisation d'une marque seront intégrés aux propriétaires de la marque et le montant de l'investissement dans la marque potentiellement renommée s'accroît. La même année, Richard A. Posner, écrit l'article "l'efficience et l'efficacité du titre VII" dans lequel il fait valoir que les lois de non discrimination à l'emploi sont économiquement inefficaces, car elles empêchent les employeurs de prendre des décisions économiques rationnelles au sujet de l'embauche et du licenciement des employés. Le Juge Posner note également que ces lois imposent des coûts énormes sur la société, résultant en grande partie du grand nombre de cas de discrimination que traitent les tribunaux chaque année. En outre, Richard Posner avancent que les lois de non discrimination à l'emploi ne sont pas faites réellement pour aider les groupes minoritaires qu'elles sont censées protéger. Mais, ces lois rendent plus coûteux pour les employeurs d'embaucher, de retenir, et de licencier les travailleurs des minorités. Les lois de non discrimination à l'emploi donnent une forte incitation aux employeurs d'éviter purement et simplement les travailleurs des minorités. Par conséquent, Richard Posner conclut que les coûts énormes générés par le titre VII (Loi de non discrimination à l'emploi aux USA) sont un "poids mort" pour l'ensemble de la société.


Bibliographie

De 1969 à 1979

  • 1969,
    • a. The Federal Trade Commission, University of Chicago Law Review 37(1): 47-89
    • b. Oligopoly and Antitrust Laws: A suggested Approach, Stanford Law Review, 21 (3): 548-643.

  • 1970, “A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement.” Journal of Law and Economics, 13 (2): 365-419
  • 1971,
    • a. Killing or Wounding to Protect Property Interests, Journal of Law and Economics, 14, April, pp201—232
    • b. Taxation by Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics & Management Science, 22
  • 1972,
    • a. The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 3: 98-129
    • b. Economic Analysis of Law. Boston: Little, Brown
      • 2nde édition en 1977,
      • 3ème édition en 1986,
      • 5ème édition en 1998, New York: Aspen Law and Busines
      • 6ème édition en 2003, Aspen Law & Business
  • 1973,
    • a. Strict Liability: A Comment, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 2, pp205-221
    • b. An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 2, p399
  • 1974,
    • a. Theories of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 5 (automne) : pp335-338
    • b. avec Isaac Ehrlich, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Jan.), pp257-286
  • 1975,
    • a. avec William M. Landes, “The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective”, The Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (3), décembre, pp875-901
    • b. The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation, Journal of Political Economy, 83 (août) : pp. 807-827
    • c. The Economic Approach to Law, Texas Law Review, 53:757-782
    • d. Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, Columbia Law Review, vol. 75, pp282-293
  • 1976,
    • a. avec William M. Landes, “Legal Precedent, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, The Journal of Law and Economics, pp249-313
    • b. Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press)
    • c. The Robinson-Patman Act: Federal Regulation of Price Differences, American Enterprise Institute
  • 1977,
    • a. "The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision", University of Chicago Law Review, vol 45, Autumn, pp1-20
    • b. “Gratuitius Promises in Economics and Law”, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 6, pp411-412
    • c. avec Andrew M. Rosenfield, “Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law. An Economic Analysis”, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 6, n°83
  • 1978, “The Right of Privacy”, Georgia Law Review, Vol 12, n°3, Spring, pp393-422
  • 1979,
    • a. Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol 46, n°2, pp281-306
    • b. The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 127 (4), 925-1033
    • c. Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, Journal of Legal Studies, pp103-40

De 1980 à 1989

  • 1980,
    • a. Anthropology and Economics: Review Article, Journal of Political Economy 88(3): 608-16
    • b. The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, Hofstra Law Rev. 8(3), pp487-507
    • c. A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law, Journal of Law and Economics 23, pp1-56
    • d. avec William M. Landes, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction, Journal of Legal Studies, 9, March, pp367—386
    • e. avec Kenneth E. Scott, dir., Economics of Corporation Law and Securities Regulation, Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Cy
    • f. The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, Journal of Legal Studies, 9:243–52
    • g. avec William M. Landes, "Joint and Multiple tort-feasors : an economic analysis", The Journal of Legal Studies, vol 9, n°2, Juin, pp517-555
  • 1981,
    • a. avec William M. Landes, "The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law"; Georgia Law Rev, summer, 15, 851
    • b. avec William M. Landes, Market power in antitrust cases, Harv. L. Rev. 94, 937, 939
    • c. A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory of the Common Law, Hofstra Law Review, vol 9, pp775-794
    • d. The Economics of Justice, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press
    • e. “The Economics of Privacy”, American Economic Review, Vol 71, n°2, May, pp405-409
    • f. avec William M. Landes, "An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts", International Review of Law and Economics, décembre
    • g. avec F. H. Easterbrook, "Antitrust", West Publishing Co., St. Paul
  • 1983,
    • a. The Economics of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2nde édition
    • b. avec William M. Landes, "Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach"; Journal of Legal Studies, janvier, 12(1), 109
  • 1985,
    • a. “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law”, Columbia Law Review, October, (85)6, pp1193-1231
    • b. “Wealth Maximization Revisited”, Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy, 2(1), pp85-105
  • 1986, "Free Speech in an Economic Perspective", Sufflok University Law Review, 20 (Spring), pp1-54
  • 1987,
    • a. “The Law and Economics Movement”, The American Economic Review, 77 (2), (May), pp1-13
    • b. “The Constitution as an Economic Document.” Georges Washington Law Review, .56 (1) pp. 4-38
    • c. avec William M. Landes, The Economic Structure of Tort Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
    • d. avec William M. Landes, The Economics of Trademark Law, Trademark Rep., Vol 78, n°267, 304
    • e. avec William M. Landes, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, J. L. & Econ., Vol 30, n°265
    • f. "The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987", Harvard Law Review, Vol 100, n°4, février, pp761-780
    • g. The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, U. Pa. L. Rev., Vol 136, n°513
  • 1988, Law and Literature - A Misunderstood Relation, Cambridge, MA, Harvard U.P.

de 1990 à 1999

  • 1990,
    • a. Bork and Beethoven, Stan. L. Rev., Vol 42, n°1365
    • b. Cardozo - A Study in Reputation, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press
    • c. Problems of Jurisprudence, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press
  • 1992, Sex and Reason, Cambridge: Harvard University Press
  • 1993,
    • a. Gary Becker’s Contributions to Law and Economics, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol XXII, n°2, June, pp211-215
    • b. What Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol 3, pp1-41
    • c. The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol 149, March, pp73-87
    • d. "The Material Basis of Jurisprudence", Indiana Law Review, Vol 69, n°1, pp1-37
    • e. "Nobel Laureate: Ronald Coase and Methodology", The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol 7, n°4, Autumn, pp195-210
    • f. "The Problems of Jurisprudence", Harvard University Press, Cambridge Ma.
  • 1995,
    • a. Wealth Maximization and Tort Law : A Philosophical Inquiry, In: D. G. Owen, dir., Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford
    • b. Overcoming Law, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
      • Nouvelle édition en 1996, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
    • c. Aging and Old Age, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press
    • d. Overcoming Law, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press
  • 1996,
    • a. Law and Legal Theory in England and America, Oxford, Clarendon Press
    • b. The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1996 (2e éd.)
    • c. avec Katharine B. Silbaugh, A Guide to America's Sex Laws, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press
    • d. Overcoming Law, Cambridge: Harvard University Press
    • e. avec William M. Landes, "The Economics of Legal Disputes Over The Ownership of Works of Art and Other Collectibles", In: V. A. Ginsburgh & P.-M. Menger, dir., Essays in the Economics of the Arts, Elsevier Science
  • 1997,
    • a. Against Ethical Criticism, Philosophy and Literature 21.1, pp1-27
    • b. avec Francesco Parisi, dir., Law and Economics - Vol. 1 Theoretical and Methodological Issues; Vol. 2 Contracts, torts and Criminal Law; Vol. 3 Other Areas in Private and Public Law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar
  • 1998,
    • a. Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 27, pp553-565
    • b. Bentham's Influence on the Law and Economics Movement, In: Freeman, dir., Current Legal Problems, Vol 51, pp425–439
    • c. Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, Stanford Law Review, vol 50, pp1551-1575
  • 1999,
    • a. The Problematic of Moral and Legal Theory, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
    • b. Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, Washington DC, Cato Institute
    • c. "An Economic Approach to Legal Evidence", Stanford Law Review, Vol 51, pp1477–1546
    • d. "The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13 (2), pp91–99

de 2000 à 2009

  • 2000,
    • a. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 29, June, pp1153–1177
    • b. An economic analysis of the use of citations in the law, American Law and Economics Review, 2 (2), pp381-406
  • 2001, "Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline", Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press
  • 2002, "Dewey and democracy: A critique", Transactional viewpoints, 1(3), pp1–4
  • 2003,
    • a. "Law, Pragmatism and Democracy", Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA)
    • b. avec William M. Landes, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, Harvard University Press
    • c. Torture, Interrogation, and Terrorism, In: Sanford Levinson, dir., Torture: A Collection 291
    • d. How Long Should a Copyright Last?, Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A., Vol 50, n°1
    • e. avec Tomas J. Philipson, The Long-Run Growth in Obesity as a Function of Technological Change, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Summer Supplement, p. S87
    • f. Misappropriation: A Dirge, Houston Law Review, vol 40, n°621
    • g. Desperate Times, Desperate Measures, commentaire du livre de Daniel Farber, Lincolns Constitution, New York Times Book Review, 20, August, 24
    • h. Richard A. Posner Replies [to William A. Galston], New Republic, 5, July 28 & Aug. 4
    • i. An Army of the Willing: Why Conscription Does Not Serve Community, New Republic, 27, May 19
    • j. The Anti-Hero, commentaire du livre de Bruce Allen Murphy, Wild Bill: The Legend and Life of William O. Douglas, New Republic, 27, February 24
    • k. Reply: The Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, Michigan Law Review, vol 101, 952
    • l. "Foreword", In: Aspasia Tsaoussis-Hatzis, The Greek Divorce Law Reform of 1983 and Its Impact on Homemakers: A Social and Economic Analysis, pix
    • m. "Behavioral law-and-economics: A critique", In: E. Khalil, dir., "Behavioral economics: Preference, context and action", Great Barrington, MA: Behavioral Research Council (AIER)
    • n. "Hayek, the mind, and spontaneous order: A critique", Transactional viewpoints. Great Barrington, MA: Behavioral Research Council
  • 2004,
    • a. Catastrophe: Risk and Response, Oxford University Press
    • b. Legal Pragmatism, In: Richard Shusterman, dir., The Range of Pragmatism and the Limits of Philosophy, 144
    • c. Law and Economics in Common-Law, Civil-Law, and Developing Nations, Ratio Juris, Vol 17, n°66
    • d. Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General, In: Richard A. Epstein et Michael S. Greve, dir., Competition Laws in Conflict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global Economy 252
    • e. avec William M. Landes, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies
    • f. The 2000 Presidential Election: A Statistical and Legal Analysis, Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol 12, n°1
    • g. avec William F. Patry, Fair use and statutory reform in the wake of Eldred, California Law Review, 92, 6, 1639-1661
    • h. Legal Pragmatism, Metaphilosophy, Vol 35, n°147
    • i. Pragmatic Liberalism versus Classical Liberalism, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol 71, n°659
    • j. The Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act: Economics, Politics, Law, and Judicial Technique in Eldred v. Ashcroft, Supreme Court Review, Vol 143
    • k. avec William M. Landes, An Empirical Analysis of the Patent Court, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol 71, n°111
    • l. John Dewey and the Intersection of Democracy and Law, In: Elias L. Khalil, dir., Dewey, Pragmatism, and Economic Methodology, New York: Routledge, p167-
    • m. Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and Pragmatic Perspectives, In: Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions 51, Martha C. Nussbaum and Cass R. Sunstein, dir.,
    • n. Against Law Reviews, Legal Affairs, November/December
    • o. {http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol1/iss1/art3 Eldred and Fair Use], The Economists' Voice, September
    • p. Commentaire du livre de Leslie S. Klinger, dir., The New Annotated Sherlock Holmes, New Republic, October 11
    • q. The 9/11 Report: A Dissent, Review of Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, New York Times Book Review 1, Aug. 29
    • r. "The People’s Court", commentaire du livre de Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, New Republic, 19 juillet, p32
  • 2005,
    • a. Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, Florida State University Law Review, vol 32
    • b. The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1581
    • c. The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol 72, n°3
    • d. Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(2), pp57-73
    • e. Guido Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents : A Reassessment, Maryland Law Review, vol 64, n°12
    • f. Brandeis and Holmes, Business and Economics, Then and Now, Review of Law & Economics, Vol. 1 : Iss. 1, Article 1.
    • g. The Evolution of Economic Thinking about Legislation and Its Interpretation by Courts, In: Theory and Practice of Legislation: Essays in Legisprudence
    • h. The Law and Economics Movement: From Bentham to Becker, In: Francesco Parisi et Charles K. Rowley, dir., The Origins of Law and Economics: Essays by the Founding Fathers (The Locke Institute series) (Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, MA: Elgar), pp328–349
    • i. Hayek, Law and Cognition, NYU Journal of Law & Liberty, Vol 1, n°0, pp147-166
    • j. "Preventing surprise attacks: Intelligence reform in the wake of 9/11", Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, Stanford University Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield
  • 2008, "Privacy, Surveillance, and Law", University of Chicago Law Review, Vol 75, 245
  • 2009,
    • a. "A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ‘08 and the Descent into Depression", Harvard University Press
    • b. avec William Landes, "Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study", The Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol 1, n°2, pp775-831
  • 2010, "Afterword: The Causes of the Financial Crisis", In: Jeffrey Friedman, dir., "What Caused the Financial Crisis", University of Pennsylvania Press
  • 2012, "Jervis on Complexity Theory", Critical Review, 24(3), pp367–373

Littérature secondaire

  • 1977, R. Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff, Yale Law Journal, 86 (5), 974-1002
  • 1978, Edwin C. Baker, “Posner’s Privacy Mystery and the Failure of Economic Analysis of Law”, Georgia Law Review, Vol 12, n°3, Spring, pp475-496
  • 1987, Alain Strowel, Utilitarisme et approche économique dans la théorie du droit. Autour de Bentham et Posner, Revue Interdisciplinaire d'Études Juridiques, vol 18, pp1-45
  • 1992, Lino A. Graglia, 'Interpreting' the Constitution: Posner on Bork, Stan. L. Rev., Vol 44, n°1019
  • 1993, Robert P. George, Can Sex Be Reasonable? commentaire du livre de Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Apr., pp783-794
  • 1998, David Friedman, "Richard Posner", In: "The New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and Economics", New York: Stockton Press
  • 2004, Thierry Kirat, "Richard A. Posner", In: Loïc Cadiet, dir., Dictionnaire de la justice, PUF
  • 2009, Sophie Harnay et Alain Marciano, "Posner, Economics and the Law: From "Law and Economics" to an Economic Analysis of Law, Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Vol 31, n°2, pp215-232
  • 2010,
    • Chidem Kurdas, commentaire du livre de Richard A. Posner, "A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ‘08 and the Descent into Depression", The Freeman, Janvier/février, Vol 650, n°1
    • Young B. Choi, “Richard Posner’s Economics of Organization”, Journal of Institutional Economics, 6 (1), pp59-63

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