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Benjamin Klein

De Wikiberal
Benjamin Klein
économiste

Dates
Tendance
Origine États-Unis États-Unis
Articles internes Liste de tous les articles

Citation
inter lib.org sur Benjamin Klein

Benjamin Klein est un économiste américain qui s'est intéressé à une approche concurrentielle du système monétaire et à la théorie de l'intégration verticale.

Bibliographie

  • 1973, avec Armen Alchian, On aCorrect Measure of Inflation, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 5, n°1, pp173—191
  • 1974, "The Competitive Supply of Money." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 6 (Nov. 1974): 423-453
  • 1975,
    • a. Our New Monetary Standard: The Measurement and Effects of Price Uncertainty, 1880-1973, Economic Inquiry, Vol 13, Dec., pp461-484
    • b. Commentaire du livre d'Israel Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 83, n°6, Dec., pp1305-1309
  • 1976, "Competing Monies: A Comment." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 8 (Nov. 1976): 513-519
  • 1976, "The Social Costs of the Recent Inflation: The Mirage of Steady 'Anticipated' Inflation." In Karl Brunner et Allan Meltzer, eds. Institutional Arrangements and the Inflation Problem. New York: North Holland Publishing, pp185-212
  • 1978,
    • a. Competing Monies, European Monetary Union, and the Dollar." In M. Fratianni and T. Peeters, eds., One Money for Europe. London: Macmillan
    • b. "Money, Wealth, and Seignorage", In: Kenneth E. Boulding et Thomas Frederick Wilson, dir., Redistribution Through the Financial System. New York: Praeger
    • c. avec Robert G. Crawford et Armen Alchian, Vertical integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process, Journal of Law and Economics, 21, pp297-326
  • 1978, avec Robert Crawford et Benjamin Klein, "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process" (Intégration verticale, rentes appropriables et le processus contractiuel en concurrence), Journal of Law and Economics
    • Repris en 1986, In: Louis Putterman, Randall S. Kroszner, dir., "The Economic Nature of the Firm. A Reader", Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, ch 8, pp96-115
  • 1980,
    • a. Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, The American Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (mai), pp356-362
    • b. The borderlines of law and economic theory: Transaction cost determinants of 'unfair' contractual arrangements, Am. Econ. Rev., Vol 70, n°2, pp356-362
  • 1983,
    • a. Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics. 26: 367–374
    • b. avec Roy W. Kenney, The Economics of Block Booking, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 26, n°3, october, pp497-540
  • 1985,
    • a. avec Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 28, n°2, pp345-361
    • b. Self-Enforcing Contracts, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, pp594-600


  • 1988,
    • a. Vertical Integration as Organized Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4, Spring, pp199–233
    • b. avec Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as contract enforcement mechanism, Journal of Law and Economics, 31(2), pp265-297


  • 1995, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, Journal of Corporate Finance: Contracting, Governance and Organization, Vol 2, n°1/2, pp9-38
  • 1996,
    • a. Market Power in Aftermarkets, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2, Special Issue: The Role of Economists in Modern Antitrust. (Mar. - Apr.), pp143-164
    • b. Why "hold-ups" occur: The "self-enforcing range" of contractual relationships, Economic Inquiry, Vol 34, octobre, pp444-463
    • c. avec Elizabeth Granitz, Monopolization by raising rivals’ costs: the Standard Oil Case, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XXXIX, avril, pp1-47
  • 1999, Distribution Restrictions Operate By Creating Dealer Profits: Explaining the Use of Maximum Resale Price Maintenance in State Oil v. Khan, Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol 7, pp1-58
  • 2000,
    • a. Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, Journal of Law and Economics. 43 (1): 105–141
    • b. avec Roy W. Kenney, How Block Booking Facilitated Self-Enforcing Film Contracts, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 43, n°2, October, pp427¬435
    • c. The Role of Incomplete Contracts In Self-Enforcing Relationships, Revue d'Economie Industrielle, n° 92, 2e et 3e trimestres, n° spécial sur "The Economics of Contract Theories in Prospect and Retrospect", pp67-80
  • 2004, "Fisher Body-General Motors Once Again: How Do We Know When a Holdup Occurs?", WP., UCLA. 41 pages.
  • 2010, "Asset specifi city and holdups", In: Peter G. Klein, Michael E. Sykuta, dir., "The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics", Aldershot, U.K.: Edward Elgar, pp120-126
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