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Oliver Hart

De Wikiberal

Oliver D. Hart est reconnu parmi les économistes pour sa théorie des contrats incomplets. En théorie de l'organisation et de la firme, il a permis de faire avancer la compréhension du phénomène de la dé-intégration verticale.

Bibliographie

  • 1980, avec Sanford J. Grossman, Takeover Bids, The Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation, Bell Journal of Economics, 11:42–64
  • 1983,
    • a. avec Sanford J. Grossman, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, Econometrica, Vol. 51, No. 1 (January), pp7-46
    • b. « Optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information : an introductio», Review of Economic Studies, 50, pp3-35
  • 1985, avec Roger Guesnerie, Welfare losses due to imperfect competition : Asymptotic results for Cournot-Nash equilibria with free entry, International Economic Review, Philadelphia, vol. 26, oct., n° 3, pp525-545
  • 1986, avec Sanford J. Grossman, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, Vol 94, n°4, pp691-719
  • 1987, avec Bengt Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts, In: T. Bewley, Dir., Advances in Economic Theory-Fifth World Congress, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp71-155
  • 1988,
    • a. avec Sanford J Grossman, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, pp691-719
    • b. Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Law, Economics ans Organization, Vol 4, pp119-140
    • c. avec John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, Econometrica, 56, pp755-785
  • 1989, "An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm", Columbia Law Review, 89(7), pp1757-1774
    • Repris en 2009, In: Louis Putterman, Randall S. Kroszner, dir., "The Economic Nature of the Firm. A Reader", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch 25, pp346-352
    • Repris en 1996, In: Peter J. Buckley et Jonathan Michie, dir., Firms, Organizations and Contracts, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp199-218
  • 1990,
    • a. Is ‘Bounded Rationality’ an important Element of a Theory of Institutions?, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol 146, pp696-702
    • b. avec Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, pp205–76
    • c. avec John Moore, "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), pp1119–1158
  • 1992, avec Philippe Aghion, John Moore, "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8 (3), pp523–546
  • 1995,
    • a. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure", Oxford University Press, Oxford
    • b. Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications, The Economic Journal, Vol 105(430): 678–89
  • 1996, "An Economist's View of Authority", Rationality and Society, Vol 8, pp371–386
  • 1997, avec A. Shleifer et R. W. Vishny, The proper scope of government: theory and an application to prisons, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112(4), pp1126-1161
  • 2003, Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships, Economic Journal, 113, March, pp69-76
    • Repris en 2005, In: D. Grimsey et M. K. Lewis, dir., The Economics of Public Private Partnerships, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
  • 2008, Economica Coase Lecture Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm, Economica, Vol. 75, n°299, August, pp404-411

Littérature secondaire

  • 1998, Harold Demsetz, commentaire du livre d'Oliver Hart, "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure", Journal of Political Economy, Vol 106, pp446–452
  • 2016, Nicolai J. Foss, Peter J. Klein, "Reflections on the 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize for contract theory (Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström)", Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, Vol 9, n°2, dec., pp167-180
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