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James M. Buchanan (Bibliographie)

De Wikiberal

Cet article présente la liste des œuvres de James M. Buchanan, de façon aussi exhaustive que possible. Pour une présentation de l'auteur et de sa pensée, voir l'article dédié.

Années 1950

  • 1952, "The Pricing of Highway Services", National Tax Journal, Vol 5, n°2, June, p106
  • 1954,
    • a. "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market", Journal of Political Economy, Vol 62, August, pp334-343
    • b. "Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets", Journal of Political Economy, Vol 62, pp114-123
  • 1958,
    • a. “Ceteris Paribus: Some Notes on Methodology”, Southern Economic Journal, Vol 24, pp259–270
    • b. "The Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy", University of Virginia News Letter, Vol 35, n°2, pp5–9
  • 1959, “Positive Economics, Welfare Economics and Welfare Economics.” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 2, n°1, pp124-138

Années 1960

  • 1960,
    • a. "La scienza delle finanze”: The Italian Tradition in Fiscal Theory. In: Fiscal Theory and Political Economy. Selected Essays. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, pp24-74
    • b. Fiscal Theory and Political Economy, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press
  • 1962,
    • a. avec Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
      • Nouvelle édition en 1999, Liberty Fund: Indianapolis
    • b. The Relevance of Pareto Optimality, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI (4): 341-354
    • c. Easy Budgets and Tight Money, Lloyds Bank Review 64 (avril): 17-30
    • d. avec William C. Stubblebine, "Externality, Economica N.S. 29: 371-84
      • Repris en 1973, In: Robert Staaf et Francis Tannian, Dir., Externalities. New York: Dunnellen
    • e. Predictability: The Criterion of Monetary Policy, In: Leland Yeager, Dir., In Search of a Monetary Constitution. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp155-181
    • f. Politics, Policy, and the Pigouvian Margins, Economica, n.s., 29, February, pp17–28
  • 1963,
    • a. "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes", Journal of Political Economy, 71, octobre, pp457-469
    • b. "Sovranità nazionale, pianificazione nazionale e libertà economica", Il Politico, n°1: La ricomparsa della pianificazione economica in occidente, pp121-
  • 1964, “What Should Economists do?” Southern Economic Journal, XXX (3): 213-222
  • 1965,
    • a. "An Economic Theory of Clubs." Economica, Vol 32, pp1-14
      • Repris en 1973, In: Robert Staaf et Francis Tannian, Dir., Externalities. New York: Dunnellen
      • Repris en 1988, In: The Theory of Market Failure, Tyler Cowen, Dir., Fairfax, VA, George Mason University Press, pp193-208
    • b. "Ethical Rules, Expected Values, and Large Numbers", Ethics, Vol 76, October, pp1–13
    • c. "Are Rational Economic Policies Feasible in Western Democratic Countries?", Il Politico, n°2: Nuovi studi sulla pianificazione, pp13-
      • Traduction en italien en 1965, "È possibile attuare delle politiche economiche razionali nei paesi democratici occidentali?", Il Politico, n°2: Nuovi studi sulla pianificazione, pp21-
    • d. "The Inconsistencies of the National Health Service", Londres: Institute of Economic Affairs
  • 1967,
    • a. Politics and Science: Reflections on Knights Critique of Polanyi, Ethics, 77 (4): 303-310
    • b. Public finance in democratic process: Fiscal institutions and individual choice, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press
  • 1968,
    • a. The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Chicago: Rand McNally
    • b. An Economic Approach to ‘Scientific Politics’
      • Repris en 1979, In: James M. Buchanan, What Should Economists Do? Indianapolis: Liberty Press.Buchanan, pp143-159
    • c. Frank H. Knight, In: International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York: MacMillan, pp424–428
    • d. “A Public Choice Approach to Public Utility Pricing”, Public Choice, 5, pp1-17
  • 1969,
    • a. Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory
      • Nouvelle édition en 1999, "Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory", Vol 6, Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund
    • b. Is Economics the Science of Choice?, In: Roads to Freedom -Essays in Honour of Friedrich A. von Hayek, Erich Streissler, Dir., New York: Augustus M. Kelley
      • Repris en 1979, In: James M. Buchanan, What Should Economists Do? Indianapolis: Liberty Press, pp39-63

Années 1970

  • 1970, avec Nicos E. Devletoglou, "Academia in Anarchy: An Economic Diagnosis", Basic Books: New York
  • 1972,
    • a. Politics, Property and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation of Miller, et al. v. Schoene, Journal of Law and Economics 15(2): 439-52
    • b. avec Robert D. Tollison, Dir., Theory of public choice, political applications of economics, University of Michigan Press, Ann Harbor
    • c. Before Public Choice, In: Gordon Tullock, Dir., Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy (Blacksburg, Va.: Center for the Study of Public Choice)
    • d. avec Charles J. Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility, Journal of Public Economics, 1: 25-43
  • 1973,
    • a. “The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State, Natural Resources Journal, Vol 13
    • b. "America’s Third Century in Perspective", Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol 1, November, pp3–12
  • 1974,
    • a. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
    • b. Commentaire sur le livre de David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to Radical Capitalism," The Journal of Economic Litterature, Vol. X11, No. 3 (1974). p915
    • c. Good Economics-Bad Law, Virginia Law Review, 60(3): 483-492
    • d. "Hegel and the Calculus of Voting", Public Choice, Sping, pp99-101
  • 1975,
    • a. avec Gordon Tullock, "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls versus Taxes." American Economic Review 65: 139-47
    • b. avec Warren J. Samuels, On Some Fundamental Issues in Political Economy: An Exchange of Correspondence, Journal of Economic Issues 9: 15-38
    • c. A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory, The American Economic Review, 65 (2), May, pp225-230
    • d. The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective: A comment, The Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (3): 903-905
    • e. "The Limits of Liberty - Between Anarchy and Leviathan", Chicago: University of Chicago Press
    • f. "The Samaritan’s Dilemma", In: E.S. Phelps, dir., "Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory", New York: Russell Sage Foundation
  • 1976,
    • a. The Justice of Natural Liberty, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 5, n°1, Jan, pp1-16
      • Repris en 1978, In: [Fred Glahe]], dir., "Adam Smith and the Wealth of Nations: Bicentennial Essays 1776–1976", Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, pp61–81
      • Repris en 1979, In: Gerald O’Driscoll, dir., "Adam Smith and Modern Political Economy", Ames: Iowa State University Press, pp117–131
      • Repris en 1987, In: Robert D. Tollison et Viktor J. Vanberg, dir., "Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy", College Station: Texas A&M University Press, pp253–268
    • b. "Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem", Journal of Political Economy, vol.84, pp.337-342
    • c. Taxation in Fiscal Exchange, Journal of Public Economics 6 (juillet-August), pp17-29
    • d. Methods and Morals in Economics: The Ayres-Knight Discussion, In: Science and Ceremony, The Institutional Economics of C.E. Ayres, W. Breit et W.P. Culbertson, Jr., Dir., Austin: Univ. of Texas Press
    • e. Public Goods and National Liberty, In: T. Wilson and A. Skinner, Dir., The Market and the State: Essays in Honour of Adam Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 271-286
    • f. avec Nicolaus Tideman, "Gold, Money and the Law: The Limits of Governmental Monetary Authority", In: Henry G. Manne, Roger Miller, dir., "Gold, Money and the Law", Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., pp9-69
    • g. "Perceived Wealth in Bonds and Social Security: A Comment", Journal of Political Economy, 84(2), pp337–342
  • 1977,
    • a. avec Richard E. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit. New York: Academic Press
    • b. dir., "Freedom in Constitutional Contract", College Sta., Tex.: Texas A&M University Press
    • c. "Law and the invisible hand", In: James M. Buchanan, dir., "Freedom in Constitutional Contract", College Sta., Tex.: Texas A&M University Press
    • d. Why Does Government Grow?, In: Budgets and Bureaucrats: The Sources of Government Growth, Thomas E. Borcherding, Dir., Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, pp3-18
    • e. A Hobbesian Interpretation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle, In: Freedom in Constitutional Contract, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, pp194—211
    • f. Good Economics - Bad Law, Freedom in Constitutional Contract, Chapter 3, Texas, A&M University, pp40-49
  • 1979,
    • a. "The Potential for Taxpayers Revolt in American Democracy", Social Science Quarterly, Vol 59, n°1, mars, pp691-696
    • b. What Should Economists Do? Indianapolis: Liberty Press
    • c. Economics and Its Scientific Neighbors, In: James M. Buchanan, Dir., What Should Economists Do?, Indianapolis, Liberty Press, pp115-142
    • d. The general implication of subjectivism in economics, In: What Should Economists Do?, James Buchanan, Dir., Indianapolis: Liberty Press, pp81–92
    • e. Constitutional Constraints on Governmental Taxing Power, Ordo. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Vol 30, Gustav Fischer Verlag, Stuttgart, New York

Années 1980

  • 1980,
    • a. avec Geoffrey Brennan, "The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution", New York: Cambridge University Press
    • b. avec Robert D. Tollison et Gordon Tullock, Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, College Station: Texas A&M University Press
    • c. avec A. Di Pierro, Cognition, Choice and Entrepreneurship, Southern Economic Journal, Vol 46, n°3, pp693-701
    • d. "Reform in the rent-seeking society", In: James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison et Gordon Tullock, dir., "Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society", College Station: Texas A&M University Press, pp359–367
  • 1981, avec Roger L. Faith, "Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities", The Journal of Law and Economics, Apr, Vol 24, n°1, pp95-111
  • 1983,
    • a. Monetary Research, Monetary Rules, and Monetary Regimes, Cato Journal, 3, Spring, pp143—46
    • b. Rights, Efficiency and Exchange: The Irrelevance of Transaction Costs
      • Repris en 1985, In: Liberty, Markets and State. Nueva York: New York University Press
    • c. Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession, Journal of Law and Economics, 26, n°1, pp71—85
  • 1984,
    • a. "The Limits of Taxation", In: Walter Block et Michael Walker, dir., "Taxation - An International Perspective", Vancouver, The Fraser Institute, pp41-55
    • b. Rights, Efficiency, and Exchange: The Irrelevance of Transactions Cost, In: M. Neumann, Dir., Ansprache, Eigentums- und Verfügungsrechte, Berlin, Duncker and Humblot, pp9-24
      • Repris en 1995, In: Steven G. Medema, Dir., The Legacy of Ronald Coase in Economic Analysis, Volume II, Chapter 8, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, pp175-190
  • 1986,
    • a. avec Geoffrey Brennan, The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    • b. dir., "Liberty. Market and State", New York: New York University Press
    • c. "Cultural evolution and institutional reform", In: James M. Buchanan, dir., "Liberty, Market and State", New York: New York University Press
  • 1987,
    • a. "The Constitution of Economic Policy", American Economic Review, Vol 77, n° 3, pp243-250
    • b. "Constitutional Economics", In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, P. Newman, dir., "The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics", Vol I, London: Macmillan, pp585–588
    • c. Justification of the Compound Republic: The Calculus in Retrospect, Cato Journal, Vol 7, pp305-312
    • d. avec R. L. Faith, Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit, American Economic Review, Vol 77, n°5
    • e. Keynesian Follies, In: David A. Reese, dir., The Legacy of Keynes, San Francisco: Harper and Row, pp130–145
    • f. "Comment: Constitutional srategy and the moneary regime", In: James A. Dorn et Anna J. Schwartz, dir., "The Search for Stable Money: Essays on Monetary Reform", Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp119-128
  • 1988,
    • a. “Contractarian political economy and constitutional interpretation”, The American Economic Review, 88 (2), pp135-139
    • b. “Political Economy: 1957–1982”, In: "Ideas, Their Origins, and Their Consequences", Thomas Jefferson Center Foundation, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, pp119–130 (conférence donnée le 20 avril 1983)
  • 1989,
    • a. "Hayek and the Forces of History", Humane Studies Review, Vol 6, pp3–4
    • b. “Free Trade and Producer-Interest Politics”, In: Essays on the Political Economy, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp52-66
    • c. avec Viktor Vanberg, "A Theory of Leadership and Deference in Constitutional Construction", Public Choice, Vol 61, n°1, Apr., pp15-27
    • d. "Shackle and a lecture in Pittsburgh", Market Process, Vol 7, Spring, pp2–4

Années 1990

  • 1990,
    • a. "The Domain of Constitutional Economics", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 1, n°1, pp1-19
    • b. "Socialism Is Dead; Leviathan Lives", Wall Street Journal, editorial page, 18 juillet
  • 1991,
    • a. Dir., Constitutional Economics, Oxford, Basil Blackwell
    • b. avec Viktor Vanberg, The Market as a Creative Process, Economics and Philosophy Vol. 7, pp167–186
      • Repris en 1994, In: D. M. Hausman, dir., The Philosophy of Economics, New York: Cambridge University, pp315-335
    • c. The Economics and Ethics of Constitutional Order, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press
    • d. "Jack Wiseman: A Personal Appreciation", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 2, pp1-6
    • e. The Domain of Constitutional Political Economy, In: James M. Buchanan, Dir., The Economics and Ethics of Constitutional Order, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, pp3-18
    • f. avec Dwight R. Lee, "Cartels, Coalitions, and Constitutional Politics", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 2, pp139-161
    • g. avec Richard E. Wagner et John Burton, The Consequences of Mr. Keynes, In: James Buchanan, dir., Constitutional Economics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp91–112
    • h. "Constitutional Economics", In: John Eatwell et alii., dir., "The New Palgrave: The World of Economics", New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., pp134-142
  • 1992,
    • a. Better Than Plowing and Other Personal Essays, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
    • b. I Did Not Call Him “Fritz”: Personal Recollections of Professor F. A. v. Hayek, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 3, pp129-135
      • Repris en 2004, In: John Wood, dir., Friedrich A. Hayek. Critical Assessments, Londres, Routledge, ch 13, pp238-243
    • c. From the Inside Looking Out, In: Eminent Economists: Their Life Philosophies, Michael Szenberg, dir., Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp98–106
  • 1993,
    • a. How Can Constitutions Be Designed so that Politicians Who Seek to Serve 'Public Interest' Can Survive and Prosper?, Vol 4, Constitutional Political Economy, pp1-6
    • b. Public Choice after Socialism, Public Choice, Vol 77, pp67-74
    • c. "Property as a Guarantor of Liberty", Brookfield, Vt..: Edward Elgar
    • d. "Asymmetrical Reciprocity in Market Exchange: Implications for Economies in Transition", Social Philosophy and Policy, vol 10, n°2, pp51–64
    • e. "The Political Efficiency of General Taxation", National Tax Journal, Vol 46, December, pp404-410
  • 1994,
    • a. The return to increasing returns: An introductory summary, In Buchanan, J. and Y. Yoon, eds., The Return to Increasing Returns, University of Michigan Press, pp3-13
    • b. avec Dwight R. Lee, On a Fiscal Constitution for the European Union, Journal des économistes et des études humaines 5, juin/septembre, pp219–32
    • c. avec Roger Congleton, "The Incumbency Dilemma and Rent Extraction by Legislators", Public Choice, vol 79, pp47—60
  • 1995,
    • a. Federalism and Individual Sovereignty, Cato Journal, 15, pp259-268
    • b. The Domain of Constitutional Economics, In: Pal Foss, dir., Economic Approaches to Organizations and Institutions, Ch i, Aldershot
    • c. "The Metamorphosis of John Gray", Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 6, n°3, pp293–295
  • 1996,
    • a. Post-Socialist Political Economy. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing
    • b. Europe as Social Reality, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol 7, pp253-256
    • c. "Federalism and Individual Sovereignty", Cato Journal, Vol 15, n°2-3, Fall/Winter
    • d. "Economic Freedom and Federalism: Prospects for the New Century", Asian Journal of Business & Information, Vol 1, pp5-10
  • 1997,
    • a. "Can Democracy Promote the General Welfare?", In: Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller Jr et Jeffrey Paul, dir., "The Welfare State", Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp165-179
    • b. "Beyond science: The economists' enterprise", In, Roger Koppl et Steven Horwitz, dir., "Advances in Austrian Economics, Vol 4", Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp129-131
  • 1999,
    • a. dir., The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty (The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan - Volume 1), Indianapolis, Liberty Fund
    • b. avec Yong J. Yoon, Generalized Increasing Returns, Euler’s Theorem, and Competitive Equilibrium, History of Political Economy, Fall, 31(3), pp511-523
    • c. Moral and Community in the Extended Market Order, In: Viktor Vanberg, dir., Freiheit, Wettbewerb und Wirtschaftsordnung. Hommage zum 100. Geburtstag von Friedrich A. von Hayek, Rudolf Haufe Verlag, Freiburg
    • d. Consumption without Production: The Impossible Idyll of Socialisms, In: Viktor Vanberg, dir., Freiheit, Wettbewerb und Wirtschaftsordnung. Hommage zum 100. Geburtstag von Friedrich A. von Hayek, Rudolf Haufe Verlag, Freiburg

Années 2000

  • 2000,
    • a. avec Yong J. Yoon, A Smithian perspective on increasing returns, J. His. Econ. Thought, 22, pp43-8
    • b. Explorations into Constitutional Economics, College Station: Texas A&M University Press
    • c. "The Soul of Classical Liberalism", The Independent Review, Vol 5, n°1, Summer, pp111-119
    • d. "Why constitutions matter", In: Niclas Berggren, N. Karlson & J. Nergelius, dir., "Why constitutions matter", Stockholm: City University Press, pp1–16
    • e. avec Yong J. Yoon, “Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons”, Journal of Law and Economics, 43(1), pp1-13
    • f. "Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of John Maynard Keynes", Indianapolis: Liberty Fund
  • 2001,
    • a. “Game Theory, Mathematics, and Economics”, Journal of Economic Methodology, March, 8(1), pp27-32
    • b. "My Intellectual Pilgrimage", Francisco Marroquín University
    • c. "The Potential for Tyranny in Politics as Science", In: Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt et Robert D. Tollison, dir., "Moral Science and Moral Order: The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Volume XVII, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, pp153–170
  • 2002, avec Viktor Vanberg, ‘Constitutional Implications of Radical Subjectivism’, Review of Austrian Economics, 15 (2/3), pp. 121-129
  • 2003, avec Roger Congleton, "Politics by Principle, Not Interest: Towards Nondiscriminatory Democracy", Indianapolis: Liberty Fund
  • 2004, "Public choice : the origins and development of a research program", In: Richard M. Ebeling, dir., "Economic Theories and Controversies", Hillsdale: Hillsdale College Press, Champions of freedom Vol 3, ISBN 0916308529, pp13-32
  • 2005,
    • a. Natural equality, increasing returns, and economic progress: A re-interpretation of Adam Smith's system, Div. Labor Trans. Costs, l(1)
    • b. Same Players, Different Game: How Better Rules Make Better Politics, In: Michael Wohlgemuth, dir., Spielregeln für eine bessere Politik. Reformblockaden überwinden – Leistungswettbewerb fördern, Freiburg, Basel, Wien, pp25-35
    • c. "Why, I, Too, Am Not a Conservative", Cheltenham: Edward Elgar